What characterizes patients who switch general practitioners? by Zhang, Yaxiu
	  	   I	  
 
 
What Characterizes Patients Who Switch 
General Practitioners? 
 
 
 
Yaxiu Zhang 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Master Thesis  
Department of Health Management and Health Economics  
 
UNIVERSITETET I OSLO 
 
November 15, 2012 
 
	  	  II	  
SUMMARY 
In June 2001, the regular general practitioner scheme (Fastlegeordningen) was introduced 
in Norway. All inhabitants were offered the right to register with a general practitioner 
(GP) as their regular physician. In the patient-list system, the inhabitants have the right to 
switch GP up to twice per calendar year. This thesis examines which individual 
characteristics are associated with the decision to switch GP. The expectation is that the 
individuals are heterogeneous with regard to their switching behavior. By means of probit 
regression analysis, this thesis explores how the individuals’ probability of switching GP 
varies by socioeconomic characteristics and the health status of the individual, as well as 
the GP competition in the municipalities. Findings include a significantly negative effect 
of age and income level on the probability of switching GP. Findings show that gender, 
education level, self-assessed health status, and GP capacity at the municipality level are 
the factors that influence who switch GP. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
When consumers perceive that the quality of services provided by their current general 
practitioner (GP) is below the lowest acceptable level, they might decide to leave their current 
GP. The quality of GP care has a range of clinical aspects such as diagnosis, prescribing, and 
referral. Non-medical aspects such as accessibility, interpersonal skills and patient 
engagement are also considered important elements of GP quality. Most individuals leave 
existing GPs to join other patient-lists for non-medical reasons. Gandhi et al. (1997) 
performed a qualitative investigation and found that individuals switched GPs without 
changing addresses mainly because of attitudinal problems (respond of 17 interviews) and 
distance (response of 24 letters). The most commonly reported reason for switching was 
distance, long waiting-time for appointments, and a negative experience from a previous visit. 
The face-to-face interview was one way to further identify the potential reasons for leaving 
GPs; however, the number of observations was small and the findings might not be 
representative to predict important attributes in patient and GP relations. 
There are a few studies that have examined choices of GP, as reviewed in Scott (2000). Veale 
et al. (1995) found that individuals were more likely to see more than one GPs if they were 
younger females who experienced an unhappy consultation at their last visit. Scott and Vick 
(1998; 1999) performed a discrete choice experiment in their study and found that “being able 
to talk” was the most important determinant in patient preference. These studies analyzed the 
individuals’ stated preferences with regard to a hypothetical GP and explored what ideal 
characteristics a perfect GP would have. A disadvantage of the stated preferences experiment 
is that individuals do not answer the survey with real commitments, and they might behave 
inconsistently in real-world situations. Another limitation of Scott’s study was a low response 
rate (only 18 percent), which might imply that the sample was non-representative. Dixon et al. 
(1997) used revealed preferences in their study. They examined individuals who switched GPs 
without changing their address, and found that individuals are more likely to leave GPs who 
had shorter opening hours, were located further from the individual’s home and had smaller 
practices. They also found that older individuals were less likely to switch than younger 
individuals and that women were more likely to switch than men.  Lurås (2003) examined the 
inhabitants’ ranking choices of GPs and found that inhabitants were more likely to choose 
GPs who had the same gender as the inhabitants, smaller age differences relative to the 
inhabitants, longer patient-lists, and were specialists over non-specialists.  
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Godager (2012) examined the willingness-to-pay of Oslo inhabitants by calculating travel 
costs of visiting GPs and found that consumers preferred GPs of the same gender and similar 
age. GPs with specialist certifications influenced consumers’ choice of GP less than gender 
matching, and female consumers were influenced more by gender matching than males. 
However, these findings from Godager’s paper might not provide a valid description of 
individuals’ preferences in rural areas. Oslo is a densely populated metropolitan city, while 
most of Norway has a thin population. 
Previous studies provided evidence that the GP’s interpersonal skills affect the quality of GP 
services (Crow et al., 2002; Scott & Vick, 1998; Scott & Vick, 1999; and Veale et al., 1995). 
However, the personality and experience varies among individuals. The characteristics of 
what contributed to a perfect GP as perceived by a specific individual vary also, and therefore 
the examination of a perfect GP was impractical. Until now, no existing study empirically 
examined the individual’s heterogeneity related to their switching action.  
Studies by Pendleton and Bochner (1980), Waitzkin (1985) and Boulton et al. (1986) 
suggested that better educated individuals are more active in seeking information. Educational 
level might be a factor that influences individuals’ preference in switching GP. 
Ende et al. (1989) found that patients have different preferences depending on the severity of 
health problems.  This thesis perceive that severity of health problems are positively 
correlated with the switching cost. An implication from a theoretical study by Gravelle and 
Masiero (2000) and equilibrium strategies developed by Allard et al. (2006) suggested that the 
switching cost reduced the number of patients who switched GPs. There are two different 
mechanisms at play, each pulling in opposite directions. On the one hand, poor health 
increases transaction costs (contributing partially to reducing switching probability); on the 
other hand, patients with poor health might be more concerned about which practice to be 
enrolled in compared with a completely healthy person (why switch if never sick?). This latter 
argument pulls in the direction of more switching for individuals with bad health. Since the 
theory pulls in both directions, it is important to do empirical research. In this thesis’ study, 
there are two variables, self-assessed health status and chronic condition, can serve to indicate 
the health problems. The expectation is that chronic disease and health status has significant 
impact on switching behavior. 
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Dixon et al. (1997) also found that distance is an important determinant: over 50 percent of 
inhabitants chose GPs within 1 km from home, and over 85 percent chose GPs within 3 km. 
We assume GPs are randomly distributed in different municipalities. If a municipality has 
more GPs with open-lists, there might be more open-list GPs located within an acceptable 
distance in this municipality. Therefore, one hypothesis is that individuals living in a 
municipality with more open-list GPs are more likely to switch than individuals living in a 
municipality with fewer open-list GPs. 
The aim of this paper is to examine how individuals respond to the free choice of GP and 
continuity of GP services since the regular GP scheme has been introduced in Norway; we 
observe the individuals’ decision-making behavior in switching GPs, and explore whether the 
patient-list system evokes individuals’ self-perception as decision-makers; we also investigate 
the extent to which the individuals’ probability of switching GP varies by socioeconomic 
characteristics and the self-assessed health status of the individual. A probit model is applied 
to estimate the individual’s probability of switching GP. Data from the Norwegian living 
condition survey is applied. The survey was conducted by Statistics Norway (SSB) in 2008. 
We test several hypotheses that originate from both empirical and theoretical studies about the 
effect of socio-economic characteristics and the health condition of individuals on their 
satisfaction and preference of GP. Based on the literature reviewed above, five hypotheses 
were generated: 
Hypothesis 1: We expect that older individuals prefer to switch GPs less than young 
individuals. 
Hypothesis 2: We expect that females are more likely to switch GPs than males. 
Hypothesis 3: We expect that individuals with higher education prefer to switch GPs more 
than individuals without higher education. 
Hypothesis 4: We expect that individuals with health problems are less likely to switch GPs 
than individuals without health problems. 
Hypothesis 5: We expect that individuals living in a municipality where more GPs have open-
lists are more likely to switch GPs than individuals living in a municipality where few GPs 
have open-lists. 
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This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the study setting. We introduce the context 
of the regular general practitioner scheme in Norway, and then we clarify the incentives for 
GPs and patients who participated in the scheme. Section 3 describes the data from the survey 
of living conditions that was developed by the Statistics Norway (SSB) in 2008. The 
empirical specifications and the results of data analysis are presented in Section 4. A 
conclusion is drawn in Section 5 and the findings of this study are discussed. 
2. STUDY SETTING 
2.1 Healthcare reform in Norway. 
In June 2001, the regular general practitioner scheme (Fastlegeordningen) was introduced in 
Norway. All inhabitants1 were offered the right to register with a general practitioner as their 
regular physician; this new primary care system is managed by the Norwegian Health 
Economics Administration (HELFO) and organized as a patient-list system.  
The regular GP scheme is voluntary for inhabitants. If an inhabitant chooses not to enroll in a 
patient-list, it is thier responsibility to find a GP who has an appointment available. Moreover, 
the inhabitant has to pay higher out-of-pocket fees for the consultation. If a patient outside of 
the regular GP scheme consults a GP, then the patient has to pay 110 NOK2, in addition to the 
ordinary consultation fee. This additional fee encourages inhabitants to participate into the 
patient-list system. Consequently nearly all inhabitants are enrolled in the system. The 
inhabitant participation in the system was 99.4 percent in June 2001. Participation increased 
to 99.6 percent in 2008 (Helsedirektoratet, 2008). 
In the patient-list system, each GP has a list of inhabitants who have registered with them as a 
regular patient. Inhabitants have the right to switch GPs up to twice per calendar year by 
calling the regular GP scheme service line or via an online web service. In addition to the 
twice a year limit, inhabitants have the right to switch GPs when relocating to a new address 
or if their regular GP retires or reduces the size of the patient-list. The inhabitant has a right to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The terms “inhabitant”, “consumer”, “individual” and “respondent” are used synonymously throughout this 
study. “Inhabitant” is used in the context of describing one who has the right to be enrolled in the regular general 
practitioner scheme, while “patient” is used when describing the doctor-patient relationship. “Consumer” reflects 
one shopping for services on the GP market. “Individual” is used to describe one who makes decisions in 
switching GPs, and “respondent” is used to describe one who responds to the survey in our dataset.   
 
2 In this text we refer to the fee rates in the year 2008. 	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freely switch to any GP who has the spare capacity, to include a GP in a municipality other 
than where the inhabitant lives.  
GPs indicate the maximum number of inhabitants who can enroll in their patient-lists. The 
patient-list, which is updated every month, indicates how many places are available. The 
information of whether a GP is accepting new patients is public information and available on 
internet. 
After switching GPs, the transfer of medical records from the previous GP to the new GP is 
not processed automatically. The inhabitant needs to pay a fee to the previous GP in order to 
transfer the record. This payment cannot be recorded on the deductible card (frikortet); rather, 
inhabitants have to pay it out of pocket. 
Prior to the introduction of the regular GP scheme, there was no register tracking which GPs 
patients visited. Durable doctor-patient relationships were not encouraged. Since the patient-
list system was established, a semi-fixed relationship has been established between patients 
and GPs. The semi-fixed relationship has two aspects: free choice and continuity.  
Within the patient-list system, patients are still offered free choice of GP. The free choice 
consists of three parts. First, there is free choice of regular GP. Patients have the right to 
decide which GP they prefer to register with. Second, there is free switching. Patients have 
the right to switch to another GP with an open-list. Third, patients are entitled to acquire a 
“second opinion.” Patients have the right to see other GPs who are not their regular GPs.  
One may argue that the continuity of the patient-physician relationship has been enhanced in 
the patient-list system (Sandvik, 2006). The relationship between the regular GP and patient 
usually lasts a long time. As a result of repeated transactions, patients become more aware of 
the quality of the GP’s services, and hence the long-term relationship is often regarded as 
beneficial for patients since patients are poor judges of health care services, not only due to 
asymmetric information but also because of the peculiarities of healthcare services 
themselves. The outcome of treatment is not easy to evaluate. For example, GP services for 
patients with chronic diseases are labeled as “caring” rather than “curing.” Good experiences 
visiting GPs, satisfied health information collection, and happy continuous relations with GPs 
are of high value to patients.  
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Although inhabitants can freely quit a registration with their regular GP once they perceive 
deficient quality of GP services, some factors might dampen the occurrence of GP switching 
even in this situation. For example, some inhabitants are passively enrolled into the patient-
list. Many inhabitants do not register actively with GPs; instead, they are assigned to GPs by 
health authorities. Many inhabitants know nothing about their regular GPs until they 
experience an episode of illness and then have to seek GP consultations. Other factors might 
limit the occurrence of GP switching in cases where the patient is experiencing dissatisfaction 
with the GP: for example, the patient can believe that the benefit from continuity outweighs 
the dissatisfaction with the GP. Or there might be transaction costs associated with the 
switching, and alternative GPs might be experiencing capacity constraints. 
Continuity of care gives patients benefits because the GP becomes more familiar with the 
patient’s symptoms, health problems, and medical history, as well as socioeconomic 
characteristics and preferences. Such information may help GPs with medical decision-
making. If the patient enters into a new relationship with another GP, the benefits from 
continuity of care would become diminished. This aspect is described further by Iversen and 
Lurås (2011). Their results indicate that learning costs exist in the GP-patient relationship. 
The new GP needs time to acquire information about the patient; hence, the new GP might not 
deliver the best performance in the beginning of a relationship. 
The act of switching involves several features that might be considered costly for the patients. 
Patients need to spend time searching for quality information about alternative GPs, yet may 
still be uncertain about their quality. Patients are exposed to the risk that they may suffer loss 
due to switching without gaining. Hence some risk-averse patients may be in a lock-in 
situation with their existing GP even though they are not satisfied because they are uncertain 
about the cost of switching. 
The GPs’ option to close the patient-list for new patients limits patients’ choices and dampens 
the competition in the GP market. There must be sufficient open-lists in the market in order to 
allow new patients to sign up. If no GPs are accepting new patients, it would be impossible 
for patients to take action. In Norway, it is quite common for GPs to close their lists for new 
patients. According to the statistic report from the Norwegian Directorate of Health, “In 2008, 
a total of 33.4 percent of all regular GPs had an open patient-list, i.e. they were available for 
new persons/patients to sign up. In 2002, after one full year with patient-list system, the 
proportion of open patient-lists was as high as 47.4 percent.” Some GPs have a shorter 
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patient-list than the maximum patient-list they reported to the authorities (Lurås, 2003). There 
is also some evidence that GPs who experienced a shortage of patients were more likely to 
seek part-time jobs in the community health service, even though the wages were lower than 
in general practice (Godager & Lurås, 2009). 
2.2 Incentives for GPs and patients. 
In Norway, the GP remuneration system consists of three kinds: fee-for-service, capitation, 
and salary3. Only 6.68 percent of GPs were employed by municipalities and earned fixed 
salaries in 2008, hence GPs are mostly self-employed and have an agreement with one or 
more municipalities to undertake responsibilities for a list of inhabitants. These self-employed 
GPs receive approximately 30 percent of their income based on capitation and 70 percent 
from fee-for-service (Godager & Lurås, 2009). Capitation is composed of a flat rate (no risk 
adjustment) per inhabitant on the patient-list amounting to 357 NOK per inhabitant in 2008, 
and this amount is paid to GPs by municipalities. The fee-for-service payment is based on 
“Normaltariffen,” a central agreement between the Norwegian Medical Association and the 
State. For adult patients consulting regular GPs, the out-of-pocket payment is 130 NOK per 
consultation. For children under the age of 16, the payment is reimbursed by the national 
insurance administration, HELFO. If the consultation lasts over 20 minutes, the GP can 
receive an additional payment of 130 NOK from national insurance. The patient does not 
need to pay out-of-pocket for the additional length of the consultation. If the patient consults a 
GP who is a specialist in general medicine, the physician receives an additional payment of 70 
NOK, of which 40 NOK is paid by HELFO and 30 NOK is paid by the patient. 
According to the GP remuneration system, the prices of GP services follow the 
Normaltariffen, and all consumers are aware of the prices. In the Norwegian GP market, 
prices of GP services are regulated; therefore, consumers choose GP services on non-price 
dimensions (Gaynor, 2006). Based on the model of Dorfman and Steiner (1954), the ratio of 
quality to price should go up if the quality elasticity of demand increases. If the consumers are 
informed about the price, as Norwegian inhabitants are, then GPs who want to include more 
inhabitants on their patient-lists can only compete for consumers by means of quality, and this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Pay for performance, an increasingly popular GP payment scheme, has not been introduced in Norway. No 
performance targets are specified on the contract, and GPs do not earn bonuses if they achieve some pre-
specified targets. 
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can result in an equilibrium with optimal quality (Dranove & Satterthwaite, 1992; Albert Ma 
1994). 
To illustrate the mechanisms that encourage GPs to be concerned about the quality of care, we 
may model the GPs decision problem with regard to the optimal size of the patient-list, and 
the optimal service intensity to provide, similar to Iversen and Lurås (2000) and the paper of 
Godager et al. (2009). The decision problem can be resolved by maximizing the utility as: 
n, s
Maxqn + psn + v(T ! tsn)           (	  1	  ) 
Such that 
0 < n ! D   
S1 ! s ! S2   Assuming	   v '(T ! tsn) > 0and v '(T ! tsn) < 0 	  	  	  
Where q  is the capitation payment per person on the patient-list, n  is the number of persons 
on the patient-list, p  is the fee per consultation, s  is the volume of consultation services 
provided by GP per consumer, T  is the exogenously total time endowment, t  is the 
exogenously given time use per consultation, and v(T ! tsn)  is the utility of leisure in 
monetary terms. All these variables except and are assumed to be exogenous to the GP. 
We only consider the cases where  is positive. 
This is a constrained utility function maximization problem involving two constraints: the list 
size and the intensity of consultation services. In the first constraint, we specify a maximum 
demand D , which limits the maximum number of consumers that the GP can enroll in the 
practice. Given the constraint of , the GP may experience a shortage of patients. A popular 
GP who wants to have a larger patient-list may enroll more and more consumers until the 
constraint becomes binding ( ).  
The second constraint concerns the intensity of the provision of GP services per consumer. 
We assume  is limited to a range [S1, S2 ] , where S1 < S2 . We may think that the range of the 
interval [S1, S2 ]  describes the range of service intensity that corresponds to medical practice 
variation that is within medical guidelines. Iversen and Lurås (2000) refer to this range as a 
grey area, a range where the health effects of the variation in service intensity are not 
documented to be different from zero4. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Some authors refer to this area with lack of health effects as “flat of the curve medicine”. 
n s
n
D
n = D
s
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If the constraint n ! D  does not bind, then the GP can choose the optimal number of 
consumers, and these GPs do not experience a patient shortage. In these cases, the GP tends to 
enroll more consumers until the marginal utility of including an extra consumer equals zero. 
The first-order derivative of U  with respect to n  is 
  
!U
!n = q + ps + v '(T " tsn)ts = 0          (	  2	  ) 
 
Under the condition (1.2), the first-order derivative of Uwith respect to s  must be negative. 
!U
!s = pn + v '(T " tsn)tn < 0           (	  3	  ) 
 
This implies that the GP will choose the lowest level of service S1  as the optimal value of s . 
If the constraint n ! D  binds, and the GP experiences a patient shortage, then the first-order 
derivative of Uwith respect to n  must be positive at n = D . The first-order derivative of U
with respect to s  must be positive, and the optimal value of s  is bigger than S1 . In fact, if D  
is small, the first-order of derivative of Uwith respect to smay remain positive at s = S2 . In 
this equilibrium, the GP will enroll D consumers and provide S2  intensity of service. 
The utility function in (1) implies that the total cost of GP service is determined by the 
component tsn . The GP may keep the total cost constant by reducing s  and increasing n . 
Given q>0, the GP obtains capitation payment as profit by enrolling an extra consumer. If 
there is no constraint on demand of service, the GP is more likely to enroll more consumers 
and provide lower intensity of services. 
The model implies that the GP may have monetary incentives to enroll more inhabitants, and 
likewise, to exert effort in order to avoid patient dissatisfaction and potential switching out of 
the patient-list.  
Since the price of service is regulated, GPs can only compete for inhabitants by promoting 
their quality of services, and patients’ switching behavior is therefore likely to be an important 
factor influencing the quality of services in this market. 
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The doctor-patient relationship is often regarded as a principle-agency relationship (Arrow, 
1963). In this relationship, GPs hold more information about health care and health status than 
patients who seek advice from GPs. Due to patients’ lack of medical knowledge and the 
absence of an explicit contract between GP and patient, as well as the complexity of 
monitoring GP action, patients are in a weak position. GPs may induce patients to consume 
more health care than a patient would prefer if the patient had symmetric information, or less 
than a patient would prefer in situations where additional effort reduces the GP’s utility. The 
GP’s actions may result in over-provision or under-provision of the GP’s services. For 
example, Iversen and Lurås (2000) found that GPs who experienced a shortage of patients 
provided more services, such as longer and more frequent consultations, and more laboratory 
tests, to each listed patient than unconstrained GPs who could freely decide on the length of 
their patient-lists. One may argue that these constrained GPs provided more services than the 
optimal level; therefore, they could earn a higher income from fee-for-service. The potential 
inefficiency arising from GPs’ actions may magnify to the whole healthcare market since the 
GPs are considered as gatekeepers to secondary healthcare. 
The free choices of GPs provides incentives for GPs to consider patients’ benefits and 
compete for patients. Hirschman (1970) claimed that patients would “vote with their feet” for 
a better quality of GP service, and GPs would compete for patients by offering higher quality 
of services. Based on this theory, free switching may promote quality of services and improve 
patient satisfaction. It is expected that GPs would provider better services to patients under 
this competitive context. A study by Pike (2012) has supported this argument. In his study, 
GPs tended to provide higher quality of health care in high GP density areas than areas with 
few competitors. The consumers who perceived a deficient quality of care after experiencing 
a GP’s service may demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the GP by “voting with their feet” 
and leaving the current GP in order to register with another. GPs might perceive their 
customers’ leaving on their own initiative as an indirect criticism of the GP’s services and 
take actions to influence this dissatisfaction. Findings in the study of Iversen and Lurås (2011) 
support this view, since GPs with a shorter patient-list (considered an indicator of the 
deficient quality of the GP) face a higher flow of patients switching both in and out of the 
patient-list. In a study of factors influencing patient satisfaction, Lurås (2007) found that an 
influx of patients to a GP’s practice was associated with satisfaction with the GP. The results 
of Lurås’s study indicated that inhabitants listed with a GP who experienced patient shortages 
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were less satisfied with the GP’s interpersonal skills, the GP’s medical skills, the GP’s referral 
practices, and also the consultation lengths of their appointments. 
3. DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA 
In 2008, SSB randomly sampled 10,000 inhabitants aged 16 and older to represent the 
Norwegian population. By postal questionnaire, SSB asked the respondents whether they had 
switched their GPs during the previous 12 months. Respondents who had switched their GPs 
were asked to indicate whether they switched on their own initiative. Three options were 
presented to respondents who had switched GPs: 1) voluntary switch; 2) were assigned to a 
new GP; or 3) none of the above. The response rate was 64.83 percent with 6483 inhabitants 
responded to the survey. According to the survey data5, 10.95 percent (708 respondents) stated 
that they had switched GPs, with 3.73 percent (241 respondents) of those stating that they had 
switched on their own initiative (Figure 1). Comparing the numbers reported by previous 
studies, our switching proportions are greater than the 1.5 percent that was reported in 
England by Dixon et al. (1997), and also greater than the 1 percent that was reported in 
Denmark by Bjerrum and Sorensen (1992). Inversen and Lurås (2011) applied the data from 
the Norwegian patient-list system developed by the National Insurance Administration (NAV) 
and reported that approximately 3 percent of people on an average list switched their GPs 
annually.  
Respondents reported their self-assessed health status on a five level Likert scale: very-good-
health, good-health, fair-health, bad-health, and very-bad-health. The number of respondents 
with very-bad-health only accounted for 0.93 percent. Therefore, we combined the categories 
very-bad-health and bad-health to form a larger group called BADHEALTH, and used this as 
an explanatory variable. After combining, the number of respondents in the BADHEALTH 
group accounted for 6 percent of respondents. The respondents with very good health who 
comprised the second largest group (36 percent of respondents) were chosen as a reference 
group in our probit model. Therefore, three dummy variables with regard to health status were 
included in our model: GOODHEALTH, FAIRHEALTH, and BADHEALTH.  
Respondents who had an education over 15 years were considered to have “high education”, 
or otherwise were not. We generated a dummy variable HIGHEDUCATION, which takes the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 A Stata 11.2 mac version is applied to conduct data analysis. 	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value 1 if the respondent had high education. In our dataset, income was measured by 
Norwegian currency NOK, and it ranged from  -0.96 million to 0.96 million. The median 
income was 0.3 million. Income over 0.3 million was considered high income. Another 
dummy variable was generated, HIGHINCOME, which takes the value 1 if the respondent 
earns more than 0.3 million NOK annually.  
 
 
Figure 1 Histogram of respondents switched GPs or not 
 
Based on the literature review in section 1.3, some characteristics are highly relevant to a 
patient’s leaving their GP and a patient’s preference of GP choice. Age and gender (Kerssens, 
1987; Scott &Vick, 1998; Dixon et al., 1997; Lurås, 2003; Fang, 2004); education level 
(Pendleton & Bochner, 1980; Waitzkin, 1985; Boulton et al., 1986); severity of health 
problem (Ende et al., 1989) and GP capacity (Iversen & Lurås, 2011) are the presumptive 
influential factors.  
Our dataset includes variables such as age, gender, income level, education level, and health 
status to describe the heterogeneity of decision makers, as well as variables describing the GP 
capacity as an indicator of competition in the GP market. We found that age, health status, and 
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chronic disease were correlated with each other. We also found that income was correlated 
with gender, high education, chronic disease, and health status; see Table 7 in Appendix for 
the correlation values. Our models do not include any interaction term as explanatory variable 
due to the relatively small number of voluntarily switching individuals. The following ten 
explanatory variables are included in our analysis (see Table 1). 
Table 1 Definition of explanatory variables. 
Variable name Definition 
AGE Age of individual (December 2008). 
 
FEMALE 
 
FEMALE=1 if individual was a female. 
HIGHEDUCATION Education level of individual. 
HIGHEDU=1 if individual had more than 15 years of education. 
 
HIGHINCOME 
Income level of individual. 
HIGHINCOME=1 if individual earned more than median income. 
 
GOODHEALTH 
Health status of individual. 
GOODHEALTH=1 if individual reported self-assessed health status as 
“good health” according to five level Likert scale. 
FAIRHEALTH Health status of individual. 
FAIRHEALTH=1 if individual reported self-assessed health status as 
“fair health” according to five level Likert scale. 
 
BADHEALTH 
Health status of individual. 
BADHEALTH=1 if individual reported self-assessed health status as 
“bad health” or “very bad health” according to five level Likert scale. 
CHRONIC Chronic condition of individual. 
CHRONIC=1 if individual had a chronic disease. 
GPCAPACITY Number of GP with open-list in each municipality. 
 
 
OPENPERTENTH 
Number of GP with open-list per 10,000 inhabitants in each 
municipality. 
The OPENPERTENTH is given by 
, where  was 
the number of inhabitant in municipality . 
	  	  
Following Godager et al. (2012), we included two variables to measure the level of GP 
competition in the municipalities: GPCAPACITY and OPENPERTENTH. GPCAPACITY is 
the number of GPs with open-lists in each municipality. When GPCAPACITY is high, the 
individual has a large menu of GPs to choose from if the individual decides to switch GPs. 
Since GPCAPACITY is likely to be large simply due to the size of the municipality, we also 
used a normalized version of the GPCAPACITY variable, denoted by OPENPERTENTH. 
OPENPERTENTH j = GPCAPACITYj / (N j /10000) N j
j
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OPENPERTENTH indicates the number of GPs with open-lists per ten thousand inhabitants 
in each municipality. These two variables are strongly correlated, and they can only be 
included one by one in regressions. 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
 SWITCH  
N=708  
(10.96% of 
respondents) 
VOLUNTARY 
SWITCH 
N=241  
(3.73% of 
respondents) 
 
All responders N=6483 
Continuous variable Mean (St. dev.) Mean (St. dev.) Mean (St. dev.) Min Max 
AGE 41.89 (17.92) 37.46 (15.89) 46.48 (18.22) 15 97 
Dummy variables Mean (Count) Mean (Count) Mean (Count)   
FEMALE 0.55 (392) 0.62 (150) 0.51 (3304)   
HIGHEDUCATION 0.28 (201) 0.38 (92) 0.31 (1895)   
VERYGOODHEALTH 0.32 (229) 0.30 (72) 0.36 (2362)   
GOODHEALTH 0.47 (335) 0.49 (119) 0.44 (2874)   
FAIRHEALTH 0.13 (89) 0.12 (30) 0.13 (842)   
BADHEALTH 0.08 (55) 0.08 (20) 0.06 (392)   
HIGHINCOME 0.41 (292) 0.41 (98) 0.52 (3348)   
CHRONIC 0.42 (295) 0.41 (99) 0.40 (2603)   
GP competition Mean (St. dev.) Mean (St. dev.) Mean (St. dev.) Min Max 
GPCAPACITY 37.01(68.53) 57.06 (82.45) 37.69 (66.16) 0 213 
OPENPERTENTH 4.36 (3.56) 3.84 (2.44) 3.88 (2.72) 0 24.30 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the respondents. We observed the respondents 
who switched their GPs and respondents who switched their GPs on their own initiative 
separately over nine explanatory variables. In the second column, we present a description of 
the respondents who switched their GPs; in the third column, we give a description of the 
respondents who switched their GPs voluntarily; and in the forth column, we give a 
description of the whole sample. 
4. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION  
Our study investigates why some individuals switch their GPs while others do not. This 
binary response is an “either-or” case: “either” an individual switched their GP “or” the 
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individual did not switch. The observed choice of switching decision is the dependent variable 
in our model. The dependent variable is specified to take the value 1 if the individual chooses 
to switch GP, and the value 0 if the individual chooses not to switch. The linear probability 
model estimated by means of ordinary least squares (OLS) is not used in this study because it 
is well know that the assumptions of OLS models are violated in situations of discrete choice.  
The reason for this is that probability by definition takes values within the interval [0, 1]. 
Therefore, a discrete choice model with a binary dependent variable is more appropriate to 
observe an individual’s binary responses. We apply a probit model in this study. 
A probit model is derived from the study of Maddala (1986). Our observed variable is 
SWITCH, which takes the value 1 if an individual switches her GP, and takes the value 0 
otherwise. 
SWTICHi = {=0 if theindividual doesnot switchGP=1if theindividual switchesGP   
We denote by SWITCH i*  the individual’s latent propensity to switch GP. SWITCH i*  is 
defined by the regression relationship: 
SWITCHi* = ! 'xi + " i     ! i ! IN(0,"
2 )        (	  4	  ) 
 
where ! i  is a independent and normally distributed random error component, and ! 'xi is 
equal to the conditional expectation E(SWITCHi* | xi ) .  
In practice,  is unobservable. We observe a dummy variable which is 
defined by 
         (	  5	  ) 
From the relations (2.3) and (2.4), we have 
Prob(SWITHi = 1)=Prob(! > "# 'xni )
= 1" F ("# 'xni )
       (	  6	  ) 
where  is the cumulative distribution function. 
The ! 'xi  may, to some extent, include the transaction costs and learning costs involved in the 
individuals’ switching decision (Iversen & Lurås, 2011; Gravelle & Masiero, 2000).  For 
SWITCH i* SWITCHi
SWITCHi = 1 if SWITCHi* > 0
SWITCHi = 0 otherwise
F
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expample, better-educated individuals are more active in seeking information (Pendleton & 
Bochner, 1980; Waitzkin, 1985; Boulton et al., 1986). Transaction costs, such as performing a 
search, and information costs may be lower for better-educated individuals. However, 
transaction costs may be higher for individuals with higher income levels because searching 
and collecting information invests time, and we expect that individuals earning more salary 
value their time as more expensive. Individuals with chronic diseases may face more learning 
costs if they switch GPs. Initially, new GPs will be less informed about the diseased patient 
than their previous GP. Although the patients can pay an out-of-pocket fee to transfer their 
medical records, the transfer does cost and incurs a significant delay. In addition, medical 
records are imperfect substitutes for GPs to learn about their patients. GPs need time and 
further personal contact to learn about other aspects of patients in order to provide them better 
quality of services. One may argue that individuals in bad health will benefit more from GP 
switching, compared to those in good health, and those who never need GP consultations. 
Because of this, it is important to include the random error ! i  in the regression. The 
interacting characteristics of the GP with the characteristics of each individual may influence 
the individual’s choice of switching; however, the interacting characteristics of the GP have 
not been observed in our dataset. For example, we do not have data on age matching, gender 
matching, etc. In addition, the collected information cannot fully explain the heterogeneity of 
individuals. 
5. RESULTS 
To estimate the impact of observable characteristics on the probability of switching GP, we 
applied the probit model specified in Section 4, and used the explanatory variables that we 
described in Section 3 to build models. Taking account of the sample size and relatively small 
number of switching individuals, it is important to build parsimonious models. Only 241 
individuals reported that they switched their GPs voluntarily. Due to the fact that the 
explanatory variables GPCAPACITY and OPENPERTENTH are strongly correlated, we 
include only one at one time in two different models. We built two models to estimate effects 
of the respondents’ characteristics on their voluntary switching behavior. The Model A shown 
in Table 3 includes explanatory variable GPCAPACITY, while the Model B shown in Table 4 
includes explanatory the variable OPENPERTENTH. We fit both these two models under 
different assumptions: first assuming no unobservable heterogeneity at the municipality level, 
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and then we fit a random effects probit regression allowing for unobservable heterogeneity at 
the municipality level. Thereafter, we get four columns of estimations in each table: two 
columns for probit regression and the other two columns for random-effects probit regression.  
By means of likelihood ratio tests, we found evidence indicating that unobservable 
heterogeneity was present; indicating that a random effects specification is appropriate. As 
shown in the bottom of the tables, the low pseudo R2 is to be expected since most discrete 
choice models in the literature have a poor fit due to the inherent randomness in the 
individual’s decision making (Hill, 2012). In the following we discuss the results of the 
Model A and Model B from the random-effects probit regressions. 
As can be seen in two tables, the results of regression analysis of respondents who switch 
their GPs on their own desire are broadly similar across different models. All estimated 
coefficients are statistically significant except the estimated coefficients on CHRONIC and 
OPENPERTENTH. Age is predicted to have a negative impact on voluntary switching, 
suggesting that compared to older respondents, young people were more likely to switch their 
GPs on their own initiative.  
The estimation on FEMALE is positive, suggesting that females preferred to switch their GPs 
voluntarily more than males. 
Respondents’ education level also influenced their switching. Highly educated respondents 
had a stronger desire to switch their GPs compared to those without high education. 
With regard to the respondents’ self-assessed health status, the category of respondents in very 
good health is specified as the reference category. Compared to those in very good health, 
respondents in good, fair and bad health preferred to switch their GPs more on their own 
initiative. 
We also found that respondents’ income influenced their decision on switching. Those with 
salaries higher than 0.3 million NOK per year switched their GPs less compared to those 
earning below median income. 
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Table 3 Results from probit regression analysis for voluntary switching 
(Model A: GPCAPACITY included) 
 Probit Regression  Random-effects probit Regression 
Variables Coefficients Marginal effect Coefficients Marginal effect 
AGE -0.0165** 
(0.0021) 
-0.0011** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0165** 
(0.0021) 
-0.0011** 
(0.0001) 
FEMALE 0.1431* 
(0.0656) 
 0.0092* 
(0.0042) 
0.1432* 
(0.0657) 
 0.0092* 
(0.0042) 
HIGHEDUCATION 0.2642** 
(0.0715) 
 0.0169** 
(0.0045) 
0.2642** 
(0.0722) 
 0.0169** 
(0.0046) 
GOODHEALTH 0.2043** 
(0.0744) 
0.0131** 
(0.0047) 
0.2044** 
(0.0744) 
0.0131** 
(0.0047) 
FAIRHEALTH 0.2640* 
(0.1127) 
0.0169* 
(0.0072) 
0.2641* 
(0.1135) 
0.0169* 
(0.0072) 
BADHEALTH 0.5220** 
(0.1404) 
 0.0334** 
(0.0089) 
0.0522** 
(0.1407) 
 0.0334** 
(0.0089) 
CHRONIC 0.0559 
(0.0723) 
0.0036 
(0.0046) 
0.0559 
(0.0729) 
0.0036 
(0.0047) 
HIGHINCOME -0.1525* 
(0.0707) 
-0.0098* 
(0.0045) 
-0.1526* 
(0.0718) 
-0.0098* 
(0.0046) 
GPCAPACITY 0.0018** 
(0.0004) 
 0.0001** 
(0.0000) 
0.0018** 
(0.0004) 
 0.0001** 
(0.0000) 
Cons. -1.4570** 
(0.1057) 
 -1.4570** 
(0.1043) 
 
Log likelihood -877.0054  -  
Chi2(7) 137.09  122.24  
Prob>chi2 0.0000  0.0000  
Pseudo R2 0.0725  -  
No. Observation 6063  6063  
No. Obs. Per Group   Min: 1 
Avg: 35.0 
Max: 695 
 
* The estimated parameter is significantly different from zero at the five percent level in a two-tailed test. 
** The estimated parameter is significantly different from zero at the one percent level in a two-tailed test. 
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Table 4 Results from probit regression analysis for voluntary switching 
(Model B: OPENPERTENTH included) 
 Probit Regression  Random-effects probit Regression 
Variables Coefficients Marginal effect Coefficients Marginal effect 
AGE -0.0170** 
(0.0021) 
-0.0011** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0170** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0011** 
(0.0001) 
FEMALE 0.1472* 
(0.0654) 
 0.0096* 
(0.0043) 
0.1520* 
(0.0670) 
 0.0094* 
(0.0041) 
HIGHEDUCATION 0.3147** 
(0.0703) 
 0.0206** 
(0.0045) 
0.2928** 
(0.0731) 
 0.0181** 
(0.0046) 
GOODHEALTH 0.1962** 
(0.0740) 
0.0128** 
(0.0048) 
0.2020** 
(0.0758) 
0.0125** 
(0.0047) 
FAIRHEALTH 0.2639* 
(0.1121) 
0.0173* 
(0.0073) 
0.2671* 
(0.1154) 
0.0165* 
(0.0071) 
BADHEALTH 0.5023** 
(0.1402) 
 0.0329** 
(0.0091) 
0.5086** 
(0.1433) 
 0.0315** 
(0.0088) 
CHRONIC 0.0526 
(0.0719) 
-0.0034 
(0.0047) 
0.0524 
(0.0742) 
0.0032 
(0.0046) 
HIGHINCOME -0.1490* 
(0.0705) 
0.0098* 
(0.0046) 
-0.1495* 
(0.0731) 
-0.0093* 
(0.0045) 
OPENPERTENTH 0.0061 
(0.0120) 
 0.0004 
(0.0008) 
0.0063 
(0.0131) 
 0.0004 
(0.0008) 
Cons. -1.3887** 
(0.1119) 
 -1.4184** 
(0.1182) 
 
Log likelihood -886.3273  -  
Chi2(7) 118.45  95.85  
Prob>chi2 0.0000  0.0000  
Pseudo R2 0.0626  -  
No. Observation 6063  6063  
No. Obs. Per Group   Min: 1 
Avg: 35.0 
Max: 695 
 
* The estimated parameter is significantly different from zero at the five percent level in a two-tailed test. ** The estimated parameter is significantly different from zero at the one percent level in a two-tailed test. 
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As can be seen from the results, we observed a significant effect from GP capacity, which is 
indicated by the number of GPs with open patient-lists in the municipalities. Responders 
living in municipalities with more GPs with open patient-lists were more likely to switch their 
GPs on their own initiative. 
The marginal effects are broadly similar across different models. With respect to the 
interpretation of marginal effects, the probability of a female switching her GP voluntarily 
was approximately 9 percent higher than a male, given that all other variables are held 
constant at their means. High education increased the probability of voluntary switching by 
approximately 2 percent, given all else held constant at their means. The probability of an 
individual in bad (fair/good) health switching her GP at her own desire was approximately 3 
percent (2 percent/1 percent) higher than an individual in very good health, given all else 
constant at their means. High income decreased the probability of voluntary switching by 
approximately 1 percent, given all else held constant at their means. 
5.1 Robustness checks 
In Model A and Model B, we estimate the probability of switching GP voluntarily. To conduct 
a robustness check, we estimate two other probit models, Model C and Model D, by replacing 
the dependent variables in Model A and Model B. In Model C and Model D, we estimate the 
probability of switching GP all together, including also switching that was not performed 
voluntarily. We investigate all respondents who switched their GP, not only those who 
switched their GP voluntarily. See Table 5 and Table 6 in the Appendix for the results from 
these probit regressions. Compared with the results in Table 3 and Table 4, we observe that 
the estimated coefficients of FEMALE and HIGHEDUCATION are not significant in either 
Model C or Model D, while they were significant in both Model A and Model B. An intuitive 
explanation behind the results might be that there was more noise in general switching events 
than in voluntary switching events. The reason might be that many of switching events in 
these circumstances are due to reasons completely random to the individual, such as GP 
retirement or a GP who closed down the practice. 
In the results from fixed effects probit analysis, we have found that the coefficient of 
OPENPERTENTH in the Model D is significant and coefficient of GPCAPACITY in the 
Model A is also significant; otherwise the estimated coefficients become insignificant if we 
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exchange the variables GPCAPACITY and OPENPERTENTH in the models (after 
exchanging, we have the Model B and Model C). This might be because the assumption of the 
independency of observations is violated. By definition, OPENPERTENTH and 
GPCAPACITY are two variables indicating the GP competition in different municipalities. 
Respondents living in the same municipality make their switching decisions while operating 
in the same market environment, and hence there might be unobservable heterogeneity not 
captured by the explanatory variables. To address this problem, we may apply a random-
effects probit model. Comparing results from probit model with results from random-effects 
probit model, the estimated coefficient of GPCAPACITY becomes significant when we apply 
a random-effects probit model instead of a probit model. However, the estimated coefficient 
of OPENPERTENTH in the Model B is still not statistically significant.  
To check whether our results are sensitive to the measurement of GP capacity, we estimated 
models including different measure of GP capacity: GPCAPACITY and OPENPERTENTH. 
Since GPCAPACITY is likely to be large simply due to the size of the municipality, we use 
OPENPERTENTH to remove the effect of municipality size on the GP capacity. The 
estimated coefficient of GPCAPACITY is significant, while the estimated coefficient of 
OPENPERTENTH is not significant. This implies that the results are sensitive to the measure 
of GP competition in the market. 
 
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study has examined how the probability of individuals’ switching their GP is influenced 
by individuals’ observable characteristics. The results from our empirical analysis indicate 
that the individuals’ age and gender influence their decisions on GP switching. The 
individuals are more likely to switch their GP on their own initiative if they are female and 
younger. The results are consistent with our prior expectations (Hypothesis 1 & 2 in Section 
1). Our findings are also in accordance with the literature on patients’ choices of GP:  Veale et 
al. (1995) found that female and younger Australian were more likely to see more than one 
GP if they had more visits, and Dixon et al. (1997) found that females and younger 
individuals were more likely to transfer out of practice without change of their addresses.  
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The level of education also influenced the switching. We have found that individuals with 
high education prefer to switch more, while individuals without high income tend to switch 
less. This is consistent with our expectations (Hypothesis 3). Our findings may be related to 
the fact that better educated individuals are more active in seeking information (Pendleton & 
Bochner,1980; Waitzkin, 1985; and Boulton et al., 1986). These individuals might perceive 
the searching and information costs as lower since they are more used to searching for, and 
processing information. 
We have observed individuals with high income were less likely to switch their GP. The 
potential reason is that they might evaluate their time as more expensive since they earn a 
better salary. 
Our results indicated that health status of individuals had significant effects on their’ 
switching behavior. Compare to extremely healthy individuals, those in fair and poor health 
switched their GP more. The interpretations of marginal effects show that the probability of 
voluntary switching was higher for individuals with poorer health status. This implies that the 
less healthy the individuals are, the more likely they will switch their GPs voluntarily. The 
finding is opposite to our expectation (Hypothesis 4). Our finding may provide evidences to 
understand the balance between transaction cost and switching benefit. There is no literature 
empirically examining how individual’s health status influenc them to leave their GP. Some 
theoretical studies (Gravelle & Masiero’s, 2000; Allard et al. 2006) claim that the switching 
costs may dampen the effect of GP competition and reduce the number of patients who 
switched their GP. Some may argue that poor health will increase the switching cost since 
people in poor health may have difficulties to search information, or they might benefit more 
from continuity of care since their medical records are imperfect substitutes for a new GP to 
learn more about the patients.  Others may argue that people with poor health will benefit 
more from the switching since healthy people may not need to visit a GP at all. The results 
from this study imply that benefits from switching outweigh transaction costs for individuals 
in poor health. It seems that individuals in poor health gain more benefits from switching, and 
this benefits compensate for the transaction costs from time spent searching and learning. 
Therefore our findings present the indication that less healthy individuals were more likely to 
switch. 
Our findings support prior expectation (Hypothesis 5) that the competition in the GP market 
influences the respondent’s switching behavior. If there were more GPs with open-lists in the 
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municipality, it would be easier for respondents to switch due to a larger menu of available 
GPs. It is impossible for respondent to switch to another GP if none of the GPs in the market 
are accepting new patients. We note however that the results with regard to the impact of GP 
competition appear to be sensitive to which measure of GP competition one applies. One 
might therefore argue that more research on this topic is necessary in order to reach better 
understanding of these mechanisms. 
There are some limitations in our study. Previous research argues that individuals who 
switched GPs without changing addresses did so mainly because of their GP’s attitudinal 
problem (Gandhi et al., 1997) and unhappy experiences from their last consultation (Veale et 
al., 1995). This highlights the importance of collection information about the past experiences 
in visiting GP. Individuals revise their estimate of the quality of their GP based on the 
experiences from consultations. There are many indicators, such as length of consultation, 
waiting-time, and referral (Vick & Scott, 1997 and 1998) can be used to quantify the patient 
satisfaction. Unfortunately our dataset limits us to observe from this aspect. This may only be 
possible through gathering first hand data (for example by questionnaire) to explore the 
switching in more depth. 
There is evidence suggesting that individuals’ switching behavior is not random. The 
individuals who switched their GP resemble themselves on observable characteristics. This 
has important implications for the demand of GP services. The population structure varies 
among municipalities with respect to age, gender, income and education. Consequently, the 
switching behavior and demand for vacant GP places on the list also varies.   
The individuals’ characteristics have presented a picture of the individual preferring to switch 
her GP. When using the picture (characteristics of the individual) to predict the switching 
probability of an underlying population, one issue is that there were relatively small number 
of respondents switched GP voluntarily. It would be valuable to conduct further research by 
doing an empirical study based on a comprehensive register data that constitute a 
representative sample of the entire population in Norway. 
  
	  24	  
 
7. APPENDIX 
Table 5 Results from probit regression analysis for switching 
(Model C: GPCAPACITY included) 
 Probit Regression  Random-effects probit Regression 
Variables Coefficients Marginal effect Coefficients Marginal effect 
AGE -0.0101** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0018** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0097** 
(0.0012) 
-0.0019** 
(0.0003) 
FEMALE 0.0310 
(0.0454) 
 0.0055 
(0.0080) 
0.0397 
(0.0426) 
 0.0079 
(0.0085) 
HIGHEDUCATION 0.0854 
(0.0516) 
0.0151 
(0.0091) 
0.1022* 
(0.0483) 
 0.0205* 
(0.0097) 
GOODHEALTH 0.1366** 
(0.0512) 
0.0242** 
(0.0090) 
0.1248** 
(0.0481) 
0.0250** 
(0.0096) 
FAIRHEALTH 0.1302 
(0.0778) 
0.0230 
(0.0138) 
0.1094 
(0.0737) 
0.0219 
(0.0148) 
BADHEALTH 0.3189** 
(0.1000) 
 0.0564** 
(0.0176) 
0.2750** 
(0.0958) 
 0.0550** 
(0.0192) 
CHRONIC 0.0247 
(0.0504) 
0.0044 
(0.0089) 
0.1319 
(0.0475) 
0.0064 
(0.0095) 
HIGHINCOME -0.1994** 
(0.0487) 
-0.0353** 
(0.0086) 
-0.01660** 
(0.0461) 
-0.0332** 
(0.0093) 
GPCAPACITY -0.0002 
(0.0003) 
-0.0000 
(0.0001) 
0.0013* 
(0.0006) 
0.0003* 
(0.0001) 
Cons. -0.8335** 
(0.0730) 
 -0.8249** 
(0.0741) 
 
Log likelihood -2004.5974  -  
Chi2(7) 100.58  100.87  
Prob>chi2 0.0000  0.0000  
Pseudo R2 0.0245  -  
No. Observation 6065  6065  
No. Obs. Per Group   Min: 1 
Avg: 34.9 
Max: 695 
 
* The estimated parameter is significantly different from zero at the five percent level in a two-tailed test. 
** The estimated parameter is significantly different from zero at the one percent level in a two-tailed test. 
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Table 6 Results from probit regression analysis for switching 
(Model 5: OPENPERTENTH included) 
 Probit Regression  Random-effects probit Regression 
Variables Coefficients Marginal effect Coefficients Marginal effect 
AGE -0.0106** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0019** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0105** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0019** 
(0.0023) 
FEMALE 0.0361 
(0.0456) 
 0.0063 
(0.0080) 
0.0416 
(0.0448) 
 0.0075 
(0.0081) 
HIGHEDUCATION 0.0931* 
(0.0512) 
 0.0163* 
(0.0090) 
0.1082* 
(0.0509) 
 0.0196* 
(0.0092) 
GOODHEALTH 0.1325** 
(0.0514) 
0.0232** 
(0.0090) 
0.1316** 
(0.0507) 
0.0238** 
(0.0092) 
FAIRHEALTH 0.1286 
(0781) 
0.0225 
(0.0137) 
0.1225 
(0.7607) 
0.0221 
(0.0140) 
BADHEALTH 0.3100** 
(0.1003) 
 0.0543** 
(0.0176) 
0.2982** 
(0.0996) 
 0.0539** 
(0.0180) 
CHRONIC 0.0295 
(0.0505) 
0.0052 
(0.0089) 
0.0341 
(0.0501) 
0.0062 
(0.0090) 
HIGHINCOME -0.1893** 
(0.0489) 
-0.0331** 
(0.0086) 
-0.1769** 
(0.0485) 
-0.0320** 
(0.0087) 
OPENPERTEN 0.0382** 
(0.0074) 
0.0067** 
(0.0013) 
0.0376** 
(0.0084) 
0.0068** 
(0.0015) 
Cons. -0.9817** 
(0.0772) 
 -0.9735** 
(0.0816) 
 
Log likelihood -1991.6811  -  
Chi2(7) 126.41  115.36  
Prob>chi2 0.0000  0.0000  
Pseudo R2 0.0308  -  
No. Observation 6065  6065  
No. Obs. Per Group   Min: 1 
Avg: 34.9 
Max: 695 
 
* The estimated parameter is significantly different from zero at the five percent level in a two-tailed test. ** The estimated parameter is significantly different from zero at the one percent level in a two-tailed test. 
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Table 7 linear relationships of independent variables 
Corr. Value AGE FEMALE HIGHEDU GOOD FAIR BAD CHRONIC HIGHINC 
AGE 1.000        
FEMALE 0.0107 1.0000       
HIGHEDUCATE -0.0398 0.0408 1.0000      
GOODHEALTH -0.0109 -0.0199 0.0434 1.0000     
FAIRHEALTH 0.1521 0.0420 -0.1113 -0.3484 1.0000    
BADHEALTH 0.1514 0.0233 -0.0741 -0.2276 -0.1001 1.0000   
CHRONIC 0.2322 0.0541 -0.0799 0.0091 0.2704 0.2726 1.0000  
HIGHINCOME 0.0341 -0.2316 0.3231 0.0114 -0.1255 -0.1202 -0.1244 1.0000 
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